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Abstract
The political events that took place at the end of 2003 in Georgia, in 2004 in Ukraine 
and in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan are popularly called the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolution 
or collectively: the Colour Revolutions in the post-Soviet space. At first glance the term 
“revolution” may seem appropriate. The Colour Revolutions have resulted in the regime 
change in all the three states. However, from a decade-long perspective one may notice 
that the revolutionary changes in the political systems of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
did not actually take place. The post-revolutionary reality: the Russian-Georgian war and 
criminal charges against the revolutionary Georgian President Micheil Saakashvili, the 
infamous ending to the political career of the revolutionary leader Victor Yushchenko 
just four year after the Orange Revolution and the spectacular collapse of the Victor 
 Yanukovych regime, which led to a hybrid warfare with Russia, or Kyrgyzstan’s permanent 
political instability following the revolutionary events of 2005 require yet another insight 
into what has happened in Tbilisi, Kiev, and Bishkek. Without an in-depth analysis of 
the events, it is impossible to understand the fundamental social and political dynamics 
of the ongoing and future changes in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The 
re-evaluation of the Colour Revolutions is not only of historical importance, though. It is 
also a universal lesson concerning the most important challenge that all the democratic 
social movements active in the authoritarian or post-authoritarian states have to face: 
how to manage large-scale civil disobedience protests of a disappointed society while the 
ruling governments do not follow democratic rules and the international community 
does not fully comprehend the significance of the ongoing changes.
Keywords: the Colour Revolutions, Civil disobedience, regime change, the post-Soviet space
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Introduction
The Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan allowed many political scientists to form a hypothesis of 
another democratic wave spreading in the former Eastern Bloc, this time in the 
post-Soviet space [Avioutskii, 2006, p. 213]. However, the consequences were quite 
the opposite. The autocratic regimes in the region limited the freedom of the then 
already weak civil society institutions and conducted pre-emptive political attacks 
against the opposition activists. This developments coupled with the disappointment 
with the revolutionary political elites, the political radicalisation and autocratic 
trends in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan eventually made many observers doubt 
the revolutionary or even democratic character of the events in Tbilisi, Kiev, and 
Bishkek. It suffices to point out that the power change in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan and the 
end of the Victor Yanukovych rule in Ukraine in 2014 did not spur any discussions 
concerning the democratisation of the post-Soviet space comparable to the demo-
cratic euphoria in the 2003–2005 time period. Followed by the Russian annexation 
of Crimea and the undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine, today the Colour Revolutions 
are perceived as the subject to historians’ rather than politicians’ discussions. The 
broader international perspective seems to indicate that this is not the most fortunate 
course of events, though.
The interpretations of the Colour Revolutions were dominated by two general 
approaches. On the one hand, their critics saw them as the form of aggressive exports 
of the Western democracy standards to the post-Soviet space, allegedly sponsored 
by the U. S. On the other hand, their supporters perceived them as spontaneous and 
genuinely democratic rebellions that brought down the autocratic governments and 
initiated pro-democratic changes. Both approaches had strong geopolitical conno-
tations. The first one was promoted by the Russian Federation and the authoritarian 
post-Soviet states, which were afraid of the bottom-up changes happening beyond their 
control, that may have threatened the future of the ruling, mostly post-communist 
regimes. The other one was strongly promoted by Western countries perceiving the 
events as a chance to weaken the Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. Thus, 
the opponents of the Colour Revolutions see them as instrumentally inspired by 
the foreign forces against the ruling regimes and as antagonistic toward Russia. The 
supporters of the ideas of democratic changes after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
depict them as the final fulfilment of the prognoses of the fourth wave of democra-
tisation and the success story of liberal democracy. Both sides are to a certain extent 
right. Both are also partly wrong.
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The post-revolution reality requires another, a more multidimensional analysis. 
The Russian-Georgian war, the infamous ending to the Victor Yushchenko rule, the 
spectacular collapse of the Victor Yanukovych regime, Kyrgyzstan’s permanent political 
instability: all the post-revolutionary developments require a different insight into 
the Rose, Orange and Tulip revolutions and at the civil disobedience patterns they 
represent. Without an in-depth analysis of the events, it is impossible to understand 
not only the fundamental social and political dynamics of the ongoing and future 
changes in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. As the Colour Revolutions 
were driven by genuine civil disobedience, which never enjoyed a proper democratic 
or even more general political representation, their analysis also provides a univer-
sal lesson concerning the most important challenge that all the democratic social 
movements active in the authoritarian or post-authoritarian states have to face: how 
to manage large-scale civil disobedience protests of a disappointed society while the 
ruling governments do not follow democratic rules and the international community 
does not fully comprehend the content of the ongoing changes.
To comprehensively approach the topic, the paper is divided into two parts. The 
first one concerns the nature of the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space. Calling 
them revolutions turns out to be an intellectual shortcut. The political crisis which 
spurred in the form of mass demonstrations and protests in Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan created an impression of political systems first falling apart and then getting 
assembled back again by the new rulers of the states concerned. This led to a false 
assumption that the power change that resulted from the protests was an emanation 
of the systemic change while it remained just the elites’ reshuffle. The second part of 
the paper deals with the problem why the true nature of the Colour Revolutions was 
missed by the international community. As time passes by, it turns out that calling 
the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz events revolutions provided a convenient expla-
nation for every actor interested in promoting their own interests in the post-Soviet 
region while the results of the evens were revolutionary in the very name, exclusively. 
The revolutionary interpretation was useful both for the Western-like supporters of 
the changes (to expand the sphere of influence), the pro-Russian antagonists of the 
regime reshuffle (as it provided a handy explanation of their failure in the region 
because of the Western expansion) and for the new political elites as well (they were 
the only ones able to fill in the political void left after the post-communists’ collapse). 
However, everyone seemed to overlook the last element of the puzzle – the societies 
that took their grief to the streets to be left without any representation when the dust 
of the political battle settled.
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The Nature of the Colour Revolutions
The political change always takes place in a cultural and historical context of 
a certain social structure constituting the pool of the available political assets and 
opportunities. Thus, the social and political innovations to a certain extent always 
grow out from the existing social and political context. This means that every political 
change is partly based on social constructs it runs against. The cases of an absolute 
change and of the creation of something qualitatively new in terms of the whole 
social and political system are historically extremely rare. The best examples are the 
archetypes of the French and Soviet revolutions. This leads to a conclusion that as 
various challenges to the development of a political system enforce change, in reality 
they rarely lead to their absolute transformation.
The transformation of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space follows the 
above pattern. As the analysts of the post-communist change in Eastern Europe 
agree, societies far more often witnessed a recombination of political structures 
and institutions rather than the creation of an absolutely new political system from 
scratch [Staniszkis, 2005, p. 135]. Following T. Carothers, one may state that Georgia 
in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 set the perfect examples of the 
continuation of this trend. According to his observations, the ideal of a democratic 
transformation, when the democratic breakthrough is followed by a democratic con-
solidation of the political regime did not happen in reality. Instead, while analysing 
the political developments in all the three states one could have observed a chaotic 
reorganisation of the political reality, which quite often combined parallel pro- and 
antidemocratic trends with occasional shifts toward the authoritarian form of rule. 
The fact that the new elites assumed power following the mass protests against the 
rigged elections did not translate into a genuine affinity to the democratic ideals or 
the rule of law, nor the intention to introduce them in public life. In the reality of 
the turbulent changes and political instability the authoritarian measures turned out 
to be far more appealing. The consequences – the innumerable political challenges 
ahead of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan – are now at sight [Carothers, 2002, 
p. 20]. However, despite knowing this, most of the observers failed to notice the 
true nature of the political changes brought about by the Colour Revolutions. The 
question remains: why?
One of the most important yet most often overseen challenges in terms of the 
research concerning the post-Soviet space involves using the terminological framework 
developed in the Western political schools of thought to analyse the non-Western 
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political context1. In the post-communist context the terms such as democracy, re-
form, transformation, and revolution may have quite different connotations or even 
meanings than in the Western political science dictionary. For example, if one looks 
closely at the process of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan gaining independence 
in 1991, one may doubt if the Soviet rule was actually “defeated”, if it had “collapsed” 
or “disintegrated” in a fairly uncontrolled manner like many Westerners claimed, 
or if it was “deconstructed” by the ruling elites who accepted the compromise with 
the opposition forces and together tried to peacefully manage the transformation2. 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies were intended to reform the Soviet system. In reality, 
however, they unveiled its deficiencies and led to its end. The Perestroika uninten-
tionally uncovered the deep deprivation of large parts of societies living in the Soviet 
states as well as the lack of the effectiveness of the party elites to exercise control over 
the state affairs they were supposed to run. On the one hand, the compromise with 
the opposition created the opportunity for a peaceful change. On the other hand, 
the strength of the opposition translated into the scope of the compromise – from 
substantial concessions of the ruling elites and the abolition of the communist parties 
in Eastern Europe where the opposition was well established, to the easily reversible 
changes in Belarus where the opposition was barely existent.
The new political order introduced by the fall of the USSR in the post-Soviet states 
was not a straightforward democracy. It was a function of three parallel processes 
leading to more or less democratic solutions that now exist in the former Eastern 
Bloc countries. The processes involved:
1) introducing, not always in an agile manner, the broad scope of the Western-like 
democratic institutions in place of the Soviet-times institutional framework;
2) referring, sometimes over-idealistically, to local political traditions preceding 
the Soviet dominance or rule which helped to emphasise the independence of 
foreign influence;
3) adapting, usually unconsciously, the social and psychological mechanisms and 
practices instilled during the Soviet times and under the communist rule to the 
new political environment.
Thus, the development of new political systems was based on a combination of 
recalling the individual political traditions of a given state, copying the Western-like 
institutional solutions (in particular as far as the compatibility of the local economic 
system with the international free market reality was concerned) and pragmatically 
adapting the political practice of a communist state (especially within the psychological 
1 For comparison of opinions: P. Grochmalski [2006]; T. Bodio [2010].
2 For further elaboration on this topic see.: J. Pakulski [1991].
140 Krzysztof Kozłowski 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
dimension) to the new reality3. In the context of the Colour Revolutions this meant 
that the political systems of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan after the year 1991 
were a combination of the idealised memory of the sovereign past, the political 
practice of the communist times and not always an agile introduction of the Western 
institutional innovations.
It is important to understand that the final effect of the post-Soviet transforma-
tion was neither a Western democracy nor a Soviet or Asian authoritarian state. The 
post-Soviet political reality is not a straightforward reference to an absolute rupture 
with the past. It is an inherently new reality based on an innovative combination of 
the Western standards, local traditions and the Soviet heritage. The post-Soviet space 
represents a qualitatively new and unique political reality. And just as the political 
reality of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan is a function of the local, Western and 
Soviet influence, so are the political changes occurring within their borders. Thus, 
in search of the roots of the Colour Revolutions one should look not only to exam-
ine the theory and practice of the political revolutions in the traditional European 
understanding but one should also analyse how the historical examples of the regime 
change like the one which brought Nikita Khrushchev to power, had been translated 
into the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz reality.
While analysing the events one of course has to remember that in each case a set 
of individual conditions specific for each single state was involved (such as the prob-
lem of territorial integrity in the case of Georgia, the oligarchic structure of Ukraine, 
the Kyrgyz clannish history)4. In general each Colour Revolution was a case of the 
regime change that, contrary to expectations, did not represent a systemic change 
but the reshuffle of the political elites, though. In each case the society had demon-
strated radical disobedience to the ruling post-communist regime. However, after the 
regime change the new political elites did not represent the disappointed masses but 
adhered to the existing rules of political game and adapted to the existing political 
reality instead of changing it. This was possible because:
1) the place of citizens in the decision-making process was assumed by other polit-
ical actors, who usurped the role of the political sovereign (the presidential elites 
in Georgia, the oligarchs in Ukraine, the clans in Kyrgyzstan);
2) the democratic institutions and rules of conduct were a façade covering the 
post-Soviet mechanisms promoting the then modes of thought (the central 
3 One should note that the changes were demanded by the society – the opposition, but executed 
by the state institutions still run by the old political elites. See.: T. Bodio [2012, p. 880].
4 More on these aspects: K. Kozłowski [2012, 2011].
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position of the presidential elites in Georgia, the paramount importance of the 
equilibrium between the oligarchs in Ukraine and between clans in Kyrgyzstan);
3) the idealised memory of the independence mixed with the rejuvenation of the 
ambitions of the civil society under slow formation left very little space for 
a genuine reflection on the true goals of the opposition leaders (in each case after 
just one term of office all the presidents were criticised for having abandoned or 
betrayed the ideals of the Colour Revolutions).
While looking for similarities and trying to classify the Rose, Orange and Tulip 
Revolutions under one scientific category it seems more accurate to treat them as 
the cases of an unsuccessful civil disobedience rather than of a revolution. At the 
initial stage of the protests in each case the citizens opposed the ruling regime and 
protested in the streets, which eventually led to the government collapse and regime 
change. However, the new elites used the act of disobedience to assume power but 
not to change the nature of the political system. In effect the events were hijacked 
by the new ruling class, which followed the same path as the old one leaving the 
society disappointed and radicalised5. In effect the only development resulting from 
the Colour Revolutions was the promotion of the part of the political stage that was 
discriminated by the earlier ruling elites, but without any significant change con-
cerning the political system as a whole and involving a large and active part of the 
society left without any political representation.
Calling the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan revolutions is an intel-
lectual shortcut. There is no doubt that all these states were going through a grave 
political crisis which spurred in the form of mass demonstrations and protests. 
The events created an impression of the political system first falling apart and then 
getting assembled back again by the new rulers of the states concerned. This led 
to a false assumption that the power change that resulted from the protests was an 
emanation of the systemic change while it remained just the elites’ reshuffle. It is 
obvious that not every political crisis leads to a revolution. However, in the case of 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan a revolutionary assumption rather than a thor-
ough political analysis proved to be more interesting and useful for the new regimes 
and international actors. In the long run, without popular support the pattern was 
unsustainable, though. Unfortunately, at the expense of the Georgian, Ukrainian, 
and Kyrgyz societies.
5 Actually the political elites in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan followed the type of the fraction 
struggle that resembled more the fraction fights within the communist party during the Soviet times 
rather than any well-known democratic pattern of the political parties competition.
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The Interpretations of the Colour Revolutions
Two general interpretations have dominated the discussions concerning the 
Colour Revolutions. The first one is linked to the euphoric reactions to the civil 
mobilisation against the increasingly authoritarian regimes. From this perspective, 
the societies of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan stood up against the depraved 
post-communist authoritarian rulers. The other is closely linked to the accusations 
of exporting revolutions to the Post-Soviet states against the interests of the Russian 
Federation. From this perspective the events were actually Western-inspired and 
mostly the U. S. sponsored coup d’états which aim was to push back the sphere of 
the Russian influence. Such radical differences in political narrations suggest the 
prime importance of the issue to the two above mentioned geopolitical camps in the 
post-Soviet space. The fact of the difference does not mean that both are not partly 
right, though. No one would deny the spontaneous nature of the Georgians marching 
towards the Parliament in Tbilisi, or the role of the Orange tent town in surviving 
in the middle of the winter season in the centre of Kiev, or the Kyrgyz people tak-
ing over the Presidential Palace in Bishkek. However, the mass mobilisation does 
not determine the democratic or civic character of the developments that followed. 
It is hard to defy the fact that the revolutionary organisations were supported by the 
institutions promulgating the Western-like democracy standards. It is obvious that 
these institutions are a vital part of the American Soft Power. However, it is also hard 
to approve of the opinions that the Soros Foundation or the USAID donations and 
support were enough to mobilise large parts of the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz 
societies as well as to topple the regimes that were enjoying the Hard Power advan-
tage. Eventually, these were the Georgians, Ukrainians, and the Kyrgyz people who 
demonstrated in the streets and risked their lives and freedom against non-democratic 
rulers. Having a closer look it is hard not to have an impression that both approaches 
are to a large extent right as far as the merits are concerned. Yet, both are wrong as 
far as the magnitude of the phenomena they are dealing with goes.
In the each and every case of the Colour Revolution the already complex internal 
factors coincided with the not less complex developments in the international reality 
of the post-Soviet space. In the case of each and every Colour Revolution one can 
define at least three common elements of the background to the events.
First, since 1991 the post-Soviet space has experienced the political competition 
between the U. S. and the Russian Federation, along with the growing presence of the 
People’s Republic of China and the varying level of activity of the E. U., Turkey and 
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Iran6. The Russian-American competition in the European part of the former Soviet 
Union or the Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia have become a natural 
element of the political background to the functioning of the whole Eastern Bloc. Thus, 
the analysts and researchers should not be surprised by the fact of the coincidence of 
the interests of these actors and the political changes within the states of the region.
Second, the post-Soviet space is too often reduced to being Russified or West-
ernised, to being European or Asian. In reality the post-Soviet space is an amalgam, 
a unique marriage of the local traditions, the post-Soviet heritage as well as the 
Western inspirations. In every state of the region the balance between them is a bit 
different, which results in the plethora of different political systems. However, all of 
them have common roots which make them different from any other political realities 
and make it futile to compare them to the American, Asian or European standards.
Third, all the regimes of the post-Soviet space had to redefine their positions in the 
landscape of the post-Cold War World [Staniszkis, 2005, p. 106]. As their potential 
to address internal issues, economic in particular, depended on them being in line 
with the new international economic reality of globalisation, one of the most valuable 
assets was the trust of international institutions and organisations. In consequence 
most of them tried to structure their institutions in the way that best reflected the 
expectations of the international community. However, the accepted formal order did 
not always reflect the functioning of the new regimes or the real needs of the states 
they represented. Sometimes this meant that democratisation was perceived as less 
important than the formal alignment with the rapidly globalising global economy. 
In effect both the post-Soviet countries and the international institutions were often 
satisfied with the façade-like changes hiding the complexity of the unsolved problems 
left by the former communist system [Staniszkis, 2005, p. 252].
These three elements have made the post-Soviet space complex and hard to com-
prehend for foreigners, who were to a large extent kept at bay for forty years that 
have passed by between the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the 
USSR. If one combines this fact with the dynamics of the economic changes and 
the democratic euphoria of the nineties it is easy to understand why, on the one 
hand, the rest of the world was looking for easy and accessible labels to deal with 
the changes in the post-Soviet space, on the other hand, the political representa-
tives of the post-Soviet states were satisfied with those labels. The straightforward 
revolutionary interpretation of the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan did 
not only legitimise the new regimes in the realm of international relations, but they 
6 More on the concept of the New Great Game see: T. Stępniewski [2012].
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also provided easy and useful explanations of international developments to both 
their opponents and supporters.
Explaining the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan as exported by 
the West was useful for the regimes antagonistic toward the changes not only to blame 
the U. S. and the E. U. for foreign interference in the post-Soviet space. The threat of 
a revolution – whether real or not – became a convenient and popular excuse for 
imposing restrictions on civil activity and the imposition of an authoritarian turn 
in politics of the most post-Soviet states east of Belarus. The National Endowment 
for Democracy documented a long list of restrictions introduced to “counteract” the 
further export of revolutions to other authoritarian countries: abolishing the freedom 
of assembly, restricting the activity of NGOs including their registration and funding, 
exerting informal pressure on the members of NGOs, limiting or straightforwardly 
banning the activity of political opposition, making arbitrary decisions concerning 
the NGOs activity, the sources of funding and internal organisations7. The best exam-
ples are: the Russian law on non-governmental organisations (introduced in 2005), 
the changes in the Belarusian regulations concerning public assemblies (introduced 
in 2004) or the Uzbek regulations concerning NGOs introduced after the Andijan 
crisis of 20058. The threat of the Western domination also served as the justification 
to broaden the activity of the election observatory missions of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. Their major goal was to break the monopoly of the OSCE 
experts who would report the violations of the democratic procedures during the 
elections in the post-Soviet space. It is worth noticing that the results of the CIS and 
OSCE missions differ substantially. The only elections that were reported by the 
CIS observers not to meet the democratic standards were the repeated second term 
elections in Ukraine in 2005 – which were an outcome of the compromise between 
the blue and orange camps in Ukraine and were won by V. Yushchenko9.
Although it may seem to be a paradox, the Colour Revolutions in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan became one of the reasons most often given for the au-
thoritarian turn in the post-Soviet space. The alleged democratic offensive of the 
West was countered by the authoritarian counteroffensive, especially in the Russian 
Federation. It must be emphasised that V. Yushchenko, M. Saakashvili, and K. Bakijev 
were all criticised through the application of pro-democratic language, they were 
accused of prosecuting the opposition and of exhibiting authoritarian ambitions. 
In consequence, the opponents of the Colour Revolutions portrayed themselves as 
7 For the elicitation of limitations and a broad range of examples see: NED [2006].
8 For numerous examples, see.: WMD [2012].
9 For details see: A. Eberhardt [2009].
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the true defenders of democracy and the ones who would denounce the Western 
hypocrisy and double standards10.
The supporters of the Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions do not remain in-
active, though. They do not quite often object the accusations of the promulgation 
of the Western values and standards, either. To the contrary, they embrace them. 
To paraphrase the opinion of Timothy Garton Ash on the Orange Revolution, they 
agree that it was the foreign interference in the affairs of the states where the Colour 
Revolutions were happening. However, it may have been legitimised as just and fair 
– as it followed the civil discontent in these states. The propagators of such a view 
state that just like the discussions concerning military interventions for humanitarian 
reasons have already begun, maybe it is time the discussions concerning the financial 
involvement in the cases of the violations of civil liberties and freedoms were held 
[Ash, 2009]. The supporters of the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz revolutions 
perceive them as the signs of a trend to legitimise the promotion of democracy by 
foreign actors. They perceive democratisation as a global trend, and supporting 
it may justify even the erosion of the notion of sovereignty [McFaul, 2004–2005, 
p. 148]. Thus, the Western involvement in the Colour Revolutions was right, the 
revolutions themselves were the justified outcome and the Western actions were 
legitimate. The supporters of the Colour Revolutions also agree that the Western 
support was crucial. Without the U. S. and European pressure and financial support 
the societies of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan would not be able to exercise 
enough pressure on their governments to succeed [Trzaskowski, 2009, p. 88]. The 
only difference between the opponents and the supporters in that matter concerns 
how they treat the foreign involvement. For the latter the legitimacy of the Western 
interference is based on the fact of the evident violations of the electoral process 
and the denying on the part of the societies to peacefully influence the regime 
[Nodia, 2004, p. 113].
It is hard to defy the multiple electoral violations committed by the regimes of 
E. Shevardnadze, L. Kuchma, and A. Akajev. However, it is also hard to approve of 
the opinion that it was the only reason for the Western involvement. The U. S. energy 
interests in Georgia11, the apparent Western ambitions to undermine the position 
of Russia in Ukraine12 or the indispensable character of the NATO military base 
10 For example: S. Kara-Murza [2012].
11 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, an American investment of geopolitical importance to the U. S. 
in the Caucasus, in large part runs through the Georgian territory.
12 It suffices to state that the Russian President V. Putin did not wait for the official announcement of 
the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election results to congratulate V. Yanukovych. He also offered support 
to him in the media during the presidential campaign in Ukraine.
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in Kyrgyzstan for the ISAF and the Enduring Freedom missions in Afghanistan13 do 
not require an in-depth comment. Nevertheless, the opportunity for the pro-democratic 
involvement was not created by the Western actors but by the electoral violations 
and the rigged elections [Carothers, 2006, p. 62]. To paraphrase Richard Miles (the 
former U. S. ambassador to Belgrade and Tbilisi) and Feliks Stanievskij (the former 
Russian Federation ambassador to Tbilisi), the resentment of the Georgians against 
E. Shevardnadze was not planted by the West and it were not the Americans who drove 
them to demonstrate and protest in the streets14. If the government had not deeply 
disappointed and antagonised them, the protests and demonstrations would not have 
happened. And eventually, given the opportunity, it should not come as a surprise 
that West seized it to enlarge its area of influence.
Finally, one should not forget the new ruling elites of the three republics. M. Saakash-
vili, V. Yushchenko along with K. Bakiev concentrated on the reorganisation of the 
instruments of power in line with their interests. Their opponents, inside and outside 
of their countries, formed numerous accusations of the instrumental exploitation 
of the revolutionary slogans to assume power and phase out political competition15. 
Irrespective of their political affiliations, history seems to eventually confirm them. 
M Saakashvili is officially accused of corruption, V. Yushchenko failed to deliver any 
of his political promises, K. Bakiev after trying to monopolise the political power 
in Kyrgyzstan had to escape and headed to Belarus. However, the revolutionary image, 
even not supported by revolutionary changes, helped the new regimes to flawlessly 
establish contacts with the international environment and extend foreign financial 
aid, which proved vital for the expansion of their economies16. The fact that only 
Georgia was able to use it effectively is the subject to yet another debate.
The Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan unveiled the hidden 
mechanisms of the state and oligarchic model of capitalism in the post-Soviet space. 
13 Kyrgyzsan, after the U. S. lost its base in Uzbekistan in 2005 in the aftermath of the Uzbek-Western 
tensions over the Andijan events, it was the only country providing the NATO and the U. S. with a military 
base supporting the U. S. and NATO interventions in Afghanistan.
14 More on two ambassadors’ views: C. Welt [2009, pp. 155–188].
15 More on the criticism and accusations of the revolutionary leaders: V. Bunce, M. A. McFaul, K, 
Stoner-Weiss [2009, pp. 325–336].
16 In the above context it is worth noticing another interesting political trend in the post-Soviet, or 
more broadly speaking, former Eastern bloc area – the passive conformity of the political elites, inherited 
after the times of the USSR domination, to the external centres of Power. M Saakashvili, V. Yushchenko, 
and K. Bakiev seemed to fight for external support to be able to deal more efficiently with the internal 
challenges in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. However, they also justified many of their 
unpopular decisions by picturing them as the requirements of international organisations to support 
their countries with external aid. Among foreign observers, the analogies between them and the local 
communist party representatives “showing off ” in the times of the USSR to gain the Moscow support 
are getting more and more common. Some commentators are also pointing out similar patterns in new 
member states of the E. U. However, the topic requires a separate elaboration. The Economist [2010, p. 18].
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The ruling regimes, as the managers of the public assets, both in economic and po-
litical terms, treated foreign aid as just another instrument at their disposal. In the 
context of the unstable internal economic situation and external problems caused 
by the Russian crisis of 1998 all the three countries needed the financial support that 
only international institutions were able to offer. In the case of the systems based on 
maintaining an equilibrium between the different oligarchic fractions, the public 
finances are used by the government to stabilise its own influence by redistributing 
public assets between the various groups of interest. The Rose, Orange, and Tulip 
Revolutions showed that Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were no exceptions.
The Colour Revolutions also showed that an ability to obtain foreign financial 
support is crucial to political stability and the lack of it may lead to a brutal day of 
reckoning, when the actors forgotten by the government demand what they see as 
their own. The young opposition politicians in Georgia represented by M. Saakashvili, 
the increasingly marginalised West Ukrainian political and business elites represented 
by V. Yushchenko, and the southern clans of Kyrgyzstan led by K. Bakiev were fight-
ing for public assets available only to the ruling elite. The agile exploitation of social 
mobilisation by the opposition leaders allowed them to hide this aspect during the 
process of the Power change. However, their success was achieved at the expense of 
the protesting society, which was left alone again.
There is just one problem remaining. The political elites, both in the West and 
in the East, while dealing with the elites of the post-Soviet states, have forgotten 
about the societies of the states in question. Today they call for recognition. The 
social outrage against the Rose revolutionary – M. Saakashvili – in Georgia, the 
inability of the Ukrainian politicians to build a long-lasting social consensus and 
political base for their parties even in a war situation, the inability to address the 
ethnic instability issue in Kyrgyzstan by any Kyrgyz politician, all these elements 
show that a gap between society and the state has grown beyond measure in every 
single country mentioned. After over two decades of being left behind, even despite 
the genuine civic mobilisation and protests at grass-roots level, today the citizens 
of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan lost trust in the state. To a large extent they 
perceive it as an alien, just like in the Soviet times. In today’s unstable post-Soviet 
reality, as the political tensions grow this process strips the already vulnerable states 
off the most important political asset – i.e. the popular, national legitimacy. In the 
case of a potential future crisis this may leave the political elites alone against the 
rising tide of economic, social, or international challenges. And just like in the case 
of Georgia in 2008, Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and Ukraine in 2014, the politicians who 
cannot involve even their own citizens to back them up, they cannot count on any 
form of foreign support and are left alone even against external aggression.
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Calling the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz events revolutions offered a conven-
ient explanation for every actor interested in promulgating their own interests in the 
post-Soviet region while the results of the evens were revolutionary in the very name, 
exclusively. The revolutionary interpretation was useful both for the Western-like 
supporters of the changes (to expand the area of influence), the pro-Russian antag-
onists of the regime reshuffle (as it provided a handy explanation of their failure 
in the region because of the Western expansion) and for the new political elites as 
well (they were the only ones who were able to fill in the political void left after the 
post-communists’ collapse). The international community was able to do business the 
traditional way. However, everyone seemed to overlook the last element of the puzzle 
– the societies that took their grief to the streets to be left without any representation 
when the dust of the political battle settled. As the contemporary history shows, the 
consequences were not immediate but eventually proved to be inevitable.
Summary
The political changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan uncover the still ac-
tive geopolitical and economic processes which strongly influence the reality of the 
post-Soviet space while being rarely spotted by the foreign observers [Shevcov, 2005]. 
The new ruling elites had developed their position on the basis of the revolutionary 
social mobilisation. Despite the conflict with Russia, Georgia established itself as an 
important Western ally in the Caucasus. Today, it is one of the most business-friendly 
states in the region. However, the society expects the revolutionary elites to be held 
accountable for the violations committed after the year 2003. The Orange Revolution 
proved that not only did Ukraine need Russia but it also showed that Russia needed 
Ukraine. The recent conflict between these states shows that the dispute is far from 
being settled. The social disconnection between the Ukrainian politicians and the 
Ukrainian society resulted in Kiev’s inability to respond quickly and adequately to the 
annexation of Crimea as well as to the still ongoing protests against almost every 
representative of the former political circles, including the acting president. The 
Tulip Revolution unveiled the deep fragmentation of the Kyrgyz society. K. Bakiev 
initially was successful in winning support of the foreign powers but proved to be 
unable to balance the clans’ interests and the demands of the society. His reign did 
not survive one presidential term and ended in political chaos and ethnic clashes17.
17 Since the beginning of K. Bakiev’s rule, the Russian Federation exerted pressure on Kyrgyzstan 
not to provide the U. S. with the Manas military base. Irrespective of the declarations to end the lease of 
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The Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyzstan democratic revolutions represented 
an agile manner to come to terms with the complex reality of the post-Soviet space. 
In the short run, for the West it was a success, for Russia it represented the reason 
to legitimise the authoritarian turn, for the new ruling elites to gain legitimacy in the 
international landscape. Thus, interpreting the events as revolutions proved to be 
useful for the international actors involved in the post-Soviet space politics as well as 
for the new post-revolutionary regimes. However, in the long run the consequences of 
a society abandoned by the politicians may be far more important than the outcome 
of the political competition between the West and the Russian Federation.
The more time has passed by since the Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions, the 
more controversial they become. Their long-term consequences are ambiguous, to say 
the least. The democratic image of the protests did not translate into the democratic 
change. Quite the opposite, as time passes by, the democratic ideals seem to fade 
away while the revolutionaries consolidated their powers and chose the increasingly 
authoritarian path. M. Saakashvili is to stand trial under the accusations of the abuse 
of power. V. Yushchenko lost to V. Yanukovych and will be remembered in the 
Ukrainian political history as an example of a complete political failure. K. Bakiyev 
was himself overthrown by another rebellion and had to flee from his own country. 
According to international standards after the Colour Revolutions all of the countries 
experienced a dent in terms of democratic and civil freedoms/liberties. Georgia had 
made a step back in the control of its own territory. Ukraine’s politics fell into turmoil 
as the country was attacked from the outside and its regime was unable to come 
to terms with its own citizens. Kyrgyzstan experienced another series of outbursts 
of ethnic and political violence acts, and is an example of a chronic political, social, 
and economic crisis.
The vision of the democratic Colour Revolutions was useful in the short run. The 
victory has borne fruit but not to the citizens who protested and democracy supporters. 
The new ruling elites assumed power, the West and Russia reorganised their areas of 
influence but the citizens were left alone. In the long run this strategy did not work 
out well, though. The state institutions without gaining support proved to be too weak 
to face the mounting economic and security challenges. Georgia and Ukraine faced 
the Russian military threat – this time more strongly than ever. Kyrgyzstan tumbled 
into instability. The façade of the democratic change was enough to phase out the 
competition and to resolve the most pending internal and international problems. 
the base to the Americans, the K. Bakiev regime continued cooperating with the U. S. in exchange for 
several increases in fees involving the base activity. For details concerning the Manas base management 
see: K. Kozłowski [2009, p. 233].
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The annexation of Crimea and the war in East Ukraine, the Georgian loss of Southern 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Kyrgyzstan’s reliance on the Russian help prove that it was 
far too early for the declaration of victory of the democratic fourth wave. Without 
gaining civil support, which was yet wasted after the year 2003 in Tbilisi, 2004 in Kiev, 
and 2005 in Bishkek, Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan regimes are often unable 
to persuade even their own citizens to back them up. In the long run this may turn 
all of them into the pawns of the international balance of interests as without gaining 
sincere domestic support they may count only on foreign help to survive. And as 
the V. Yanukovych story shows, even the support offered by a strong neighbour may 
not always guarantee the surviving of the outrage of its own people.
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